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Asia and the Midwest
real economy
During the summer of 1997 the fabric
of the Asian economic miracle began
to unravel. The outlook for continued
high rates of real gross domestic
product (GDP) growth, which had
averaged 7% to 10% for many coun-
tries in the region during the previous
decade, turned abruptly less favorable.
National currencies, most of which had
been pegged to the U.S. dollar (or a
basket of currencies heavily weighted
toward the dollar), depreciated
sharply. Financial markets and banking
systems became severely stressed.
Several of the Asian “tigers” of a few
years ago were forced to appeal to the
international community for financial
assistance in order to meet short-
term international debt obligations.
The impact of the recent develop-
ments in Asia will be felt in the U.S.
Midwest. Asia is important to this
region’s economy, as a market for
locally produced goods and services,
as a source for imported goods and
services, and as a competitor in foreign
and domestic markets. This Chicago
Fed Letter reviews several key develop-
ments in the recent Asian situation




By U.S. standards, most east and south-
east Asian economies have recorded
comparatively high levels of economic
growth since the early 1960s, sup-
ported by high rates of investment
growth, especially in export-oriented
industries. Facilitating much of this
investment were close ties between
Asian lending institutions and the
domestic firms to which they lend.
Government-led industrial policies
were directed toward stimulating eco-
nomic expansion and promoted in-
vestment in “targeted” industries.
Governments sanctioned, even encour-
aged, close relationships between the
financial and industrial sectors, which
sometimes led to investment and lend-
ing decisions that did not meet the
rigors of market discipline. This ten-
dency, in part, underlies what has
happened in Asian markets during
recent months.
While many date the current economic
turmoil in Asia to the speculative
attacks on Thailand’s currency (the
baht) in foreign exchange markets in
June and July 1997, a more careful
reading of history places the origins
of the “Asian problem” much earlier.
For example, in Japan the close ties
underlying the financial/industrial/
government structure predates World
War II. This closely integrated struc-
ture continued during the postwar
reconstruction and served Japan and,
later, other developing Asian econo-
mies well as they focused on becom-
ing leading industrial powers during
the 1950–80 period. However, in 1990
Japan’s financial markets were shocked
with a dramatic price decline in the
equity and real estate markets. Banks’
capital, heavily dependent on what
had been inflated prices in these mar-
kets, suffered. Pressure on the banking
system continued, as basic structural
changes lagged. Economic growth in
Japan has plodded along at an average
annual rate of 1.7% since 1991 (exclud-
ing a short-lived upturn in 1996, the
annual average is only 0.9%), less than
half the average rate recorded during
the period 1971–90.
Concern about the lackluster perfor-
mance of the Japanese economy has
been renewed as similar economic
difficulties have surfaced elsewhere in
Asia. In recent weeks the question has
often been asked: Will the crisis spread
to Japan? An equally appropriate
question is: Have the economic prob-
lems associated with the structure of
the Japanese economy spread to other
countries in Asia that have embraced
similar forms of financial/industrial/
government integration, but are less
well able to deal with potential eco-
nomic disturbances?  Apparently, the
answer is yes.
By late 1995 several Asian economies
were experiencing signs of distress
similar to those in Japan from the late
1980s—in particular, inflated land
and equity values. In mid-1995, the
U.S. dollar reversed its depreciating
trend from the mid-1980s and began
to appreciate against the yen (as the
prolonged sluggishness of the Japa-
nese economy become more widely
acknowledged) and the continental
European currencies (which faced
increased market uncertainty with the
approaching deadline for monetary
union). Asian currencies (apart from
the yen) were generally “managed” by
their respective governments or pegged
to a basket of currencies; in either
case, they were heavily influenced by
movements of the U.S. dollar. As a
result, these currencies also appreci-
ated, reducing these countries’ com-
petitiveness in European and Japanese
markets. This contributed to a slow-
ing in their export-led economic
growth. In much of Asia, GDP had
slipped into the 5% to 7% range by
1997 (from the 7% to 10% range
during the first half of the 1990s).
(See figure 1.)  Foreign lenders were
becoming uneasy about the size of cur-
rent account deficits and the increas-
ingly overvalued Asian currencies.
In late 1996, the Thai government’s
concerns about the stability of its
economy led to major changes in the











































1. GDP growth in Asian countries
Sources: International Monetary Fund
and government of Taiwan.
2. Asian exchange rates, 1997
Note: The index is based on U.S. dollar per
unit of foreign currency.
Sources: Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System and New York Times.
3. Destinations of manufactured goods exports
Source: Derived from Massachusetts Institute for Social
and Economic Research data.
government’s apparent inability to
implement major reforms and con-
tinued deterioration in economic
conditions led to further changes in
the country’s economic leadership
in mid-1997. The political changes,
a disclosure that the banking system
held large quantities of undisclosed
nonperforming loans, and reports
that the International Monetary Fund
was pressing the Thai government to
address its financial difficulties quickly
translated into speculative attacks on
the Thai currency in foreign exchange
markets. The market’s view that
Asian currencies were overvalued
spread to other cur-
rencies in the region,
including those of
Malaysia, Indonesia,
and by late October,
South Korea. (See fig-
ure 2.)  The decline
in Asian currencies
further accentuated
the stress on Asian
financial markets, in
particular on business-






U.S. trade with Asia
The initial real sector impact of the
Asian situation on the U.S. economy
will be on export industries and im-
port competing industries.
U.S. exporters will find it more diffi-
cult to sell in Asian markets. First,
the sharp appreciation of the dollar
against Asian currencies means that
the cost of U.S. goods in Asian domes-
tic currencies is higher—a negative
for U.S. exporters. Compounding the
direct effect of reduced U.S. exports to
Asia is the decline in the ability of U.S.
exporters to compete with relatively
lower priced Asian goods in third-
country markets, whose home curren-
cies have remained relatively stable
against the U.S. dollar.
Second, economic policy adjustments
to Asian economies, either domesti-
cally initiated or externally imposed
as a condition for financial assistance
from abroad, will sharply curtail eco-
nomic growth. This will dampen Asian
aggregate demand, including that for
imported goods—another negative
for U.S. exports. These negatives are
all the more important given the grow-
ing importance of the Asian market
to the U.S. Nearly 29% of total U.S.
goods exports went to Asian markets
in 1997, compared with 22% in 1980.
On the import side, a reduction in the
dollar cost of imports from Asia is clear-
ly a positive for U.S. consumers and
producers who import components for
their domestic production. However,
U.S. industries competing with imports
in the domestic market will be adversely
affected by the Asian currency depre-
ciations, to the degree that lower dol-
lar import prices are passed through
and the dollar prices to consumers for
imported goods fall. Currently, 39%
of U.S. goods imports come from
Asian producers, compared with
25% in 1980.
Impact on the Midwest
The direct negative effect on Mid-
west manufacturing exporters, in the
aggregate, is expected to be somewhat
smaller than for the U.S. overall. Asia
is a comparatively small market for
Midwest manufacturers, accounting
for about 12% of manufactured goods
exports from the region (see figure
3). By contrast, about 25% of all U.S.
manufactured exports go to Asian
markets.
Nonetheless, apart from exports to
Latin America, the most rapid growth
in Midwest exports during recent years
has been in shipments to Asian mar-
kets (see figure 4). Thus, a marked
slowdown in exports to Asian markets
could dampen export growth from
the Midwest, relative to the first half
of the 1990s. (Figure 5 shows Mid-
west exports to Asia by industry.)
Asia is an important market for U.S.
farm commodities. Two-fifths of the
dollar value of all U.S. agricultural
shipments go to Asian markets. This
is especially important for the Mid-
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Source: Derived from Massachusetts Institute
for Social and Economic Research data.
5. Top Midwest exports to Asia
Source: Derived from Massachusetts Institute for Social
and Economic Research data.
soybean and corn production. For
example, in 1996, the Midwest’s share
of U.S. soybean exports was nearly 57%.
Of that, 45% went to Asian markets.
The Midwest accounted for 53% of
U.S. feed grain (mostly corn) exports
in 1996 with an equivalent of 57% of
the total going to Asian markets.1
Higher prices for U.S. agricultural
exports facing Asian consumers and
lower (in some cases declining) income
growth in those economies are likely
to adversely affect Asian demand for
U.S. and Midwest farm commodities.
On the other hand, in recent years
agricultural supply conditions abroad
(for example, China periodically
switching back and forth from net
importer to net exporter of corn)
appear to have had a major impact
on Asian demand for U.S. farm
commodities. Thus, while the current
Asian situation can be expected to
have a detrimental impact on Mid-
west agricultural exports to that re-
gion, changes in supply conditions
abroad may well overshadow the
demand effects.
On the import side, a substantial
increase in U.S. imports of manufac-
tured goods from Asian markets may
result from reduced dollar prices of
such goods. This will cause distribu-
tional gains or losses across industries
and firms. Dominant Midwest indus-
tries, such as automotive and steel,
will face increased competition from
lower priced imports. Relative sensi-
tivity to price changes between ex-
ported and imported goods will be
a key factor in the distributional
effects across firms. The greater the
extent to which imports are substi-
tutable for domestic production, the
greater the impact will be on domes-
tic industry. The net impact of these
distributional effects across sectors
is not clear at this point.
Conclusion
Demand for U.S. goods from the,
until recently, rapidly growing econ-
omies of Asia is likely to be sharply
curtailed as a result of their current
economic difficulties. This will have
a negative impact on Midwest export-
ers. Midwest manufactured goods









the Asian shock as
it contributes to
downward pressure
on prices of import-




effect on the indus-
trial and agricultur-
al sectors of the
Midwest economy, as well as on the
U.S., will be negative. The magnitude
of the net effect on the Midwest or
the U.S. economy is not yet clear.
What is clear is that the negative and
positive effects will be distributed un-
evenly across the various sectors of the
economy.
The longer this uneven distribution
persists, and certain industries increas-
ingly find themselves at a competitive
disadvantage as a result of the Asian
disturbance, the greater the likelihood
that trade policy disputes will arise
between Asian exporters and the indus-
trial countries. In turn, political pres-
sure within the United States and other
industrial countries for the imposition
of trade restrictions is likely to intensify.
The avoidance of such a scenario and
its attendant unfavorable economic
distortions is potentially a major chal-




1Agricultural export shares by region are
based on an allocation of total U.S. agri-
cultural exports to states (regions) based
on the states’ (regions’) share of total




























































































































































































































































(millions, seasonally adj. annual rate)
Dec. Month ago Year ago
Cars 5.8 6.1 5.8
6.0 6.6 6.4 Light trucks
1994 1996 1997 1995
Manufacturing output indexes
(1992=100)
Nov. Month ago Year ago
CFMMI 125.5 124.6 118.8
122.5 129.0 130.2 IP
Purchasing managers’ surveys:
net % reporting production growth
Dec. Month ago Year ago
MW 58.6 63.7 58.4
58.5 58.6 55.4 U.S.
Tracking Midwest manufacturing activity
Sources: The Chicago Fed Midwest Manufacturing
Index (CFMMI) is a composite index of 16 industries,
based on monthly hours worked and kilowatt hours.
IP represents the Federal Reserve Board’s Indus-
trial Production Index for the U.S. manufacturing
sector. Autos and light trucks are measured in an-
nualized units, using seasonal adjustments devel-
oped by the Board. The purchasing managers’
survey data for the Midwest are weighted averages
of the seasonally adjusted production components
from the Chicago, Detroit, and Milwaukee Purchas-
ing Managers’ Association surveys, with assistance
from Bishop Associates, Comerica, and the Uni-
versity of Wisconsin–Milwaukee.
Total light vehicle production (seasonally adjusted annual rate) decreased from
12.7 million units in November to 12.2 million units in December. Light truck pro-
duction decreased from 6.6 million units to 6.4 million units and car production
decreased from 6.1 million units to 5.8 million units. Production for cars remained
constant with December 1996 levels; however, light truck production increased
from 6.0 million units in December 1996 to 6.4 million units in December 1997.
The CFMMI reached a record high of 125.5 in November. The Federal Reserve
Board’s IP index for manufacturing also set a record high of 130.2 in November.
The Midwest purchasing managers’ composite index for production decreased from
63.7% in November to 58.6% in December. The national purchasing managers’
composite index also decreased from 58.62% in November to 55.4% in December.